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THE PROMISE OF SENIOR JUDGES
Marin K. Levy
ABSTRACT—Judges, lawmakers, and scholars have long debated whether
the federal courts of appeals are understaffed and, if so, how Congress should
go about redressing that fact. Even though there is currently a strong
argument that some new judgeships should be created, such a path presents
logistical complications. If a significant number of seats are added to the
appellate bench, circuits may eventually become too large to function well.
And if a significant number of circuits are ultimately split, the total number
of federal appellate courts may become too large for the judiciary as a whole
to function well. Furthermore, there are political complications. Congress
may be disinclined to authorize new judgeships, as has been the case for the
past thirty years.
But this does not mean that there is no smooth path to increasing judge
power at the courts of appeals. Indeed, a promising possibility exists that
rests almost entirely within the judiciary’s control: raise the incentives (and
lower the disincentives) for taking senior status. Currently, when a judge has
satisfied the “Rule of 80” (meaning that the judge is sixty-five or older and
his or her age plus years of service totals eighty or more), that judge can
leave regular active service. The judge can elect to continue hearing cases
and assist the court as a senior judge, but “going senior” also creates a
vacancy that can be filled with another judge, thereby adding to the court’s
overall capacity. There are currently more than sixty judges who are eligible
to take senior status, amounting to a third of all authorized federal appellate
judgeships—the possible gains are considerable.
This Essay begins the task of identifying and proposing stronger
incentives for federal appellate judges to take senior status. As part of a larger
research project on the internal operations of the federal courts of appeals, it
relies upon interview data with judges and survey data from court
administrators to identify the different ways senior judges are treated across
the courts of appeals. These variations in practice are important to document,
particularly since some of them were unknown even to members of the
judiciary. But these variations also highlight possible changes that could
improve the balance of incentives for taking senior status.
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Ultimately, the Essay’s reform proposal involves modest changes that
could create substantial benefits in terms of judge power. Its promise lies
with appreciating the finer details of court administration, including which
can feasibly be altered. Just as importantly, its promise lies with not relying
upon the actions of the elected branches, but upon changes that can be made
by the courts themselves.
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INTRODUCTION
What is the ideal size of the federal courts of appeals? How many judges
should there be, and upon how many benches should they sit? What would
seem like straightforward questions have occupied court administrators,
judges, and academics (not to mention Congress) since nearly the courts’
1228
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inception in 1891.1 Over the last 130 years, the number of appellate courts
has increased from 9 to 13,2 and the number of appellate judgeships has
increased from 19 to 179.3 Propelling the courts’ expansion has been a
growing caseload, though the caseload has been winning the race for some
time. As court scholars have noted, despite the addition of seventy judges in
the past fifty years,4 the average number of cases filed per judgeship has more
than doubled in that time.5 And so, the perennial question of what is the
optimal size of the courts of appeals has given way to a perennial proposal:
More judges should be added to the courts of appeals.6

1
The modern federal courts of appeals, first called circuit courts of appeals, originated in 1891 when
Congress passed the Evarts Act. See Judiciary Act of 1891 (Evarts Act), ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826. Before
1891, appeals from district courts were taken to the old circuit courts “in civil actions . . . where the matter
in dispute exceeds the sum or value of fifty dollars,” Judiciary Act of 1789, Pub. L. No. 1-20, § 22, 1 Stat.
73, 84, and district court decrees “in causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, where the matter in
dispute exceeds the sum of value of three hundred dollars,” id. § 21.
2
The courts of appeals began with nine circuits. See Evarts Act § 3. In 1893, Congress created what
would eventually be known as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. See Act of Feb. 9, 1893,
Pub. L. No. 52-74, 27 Stat. 434, 434. In 1929 it created the Tenth Circuit. See Act of Feb. 28, 1929, Pub.
L. No. 70-363, 45 Stat. 1346, 1346–47. Congress then created the Eleventh Circuit in 1980. See Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, § 2, 94 Stat. 1994, 1994. And
it created the Federal Circuit in 1982. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164,
§§ 101, 165, 96 Stat. 25, 25, 50. For more details on this history, see generally Jon O. Newman, History
of the Article III Appellate Courts, 1789-2021, The Evolution of Their Geographic Scope, Number of
Judges, and Jurisdiction (forthcoming 2021) (on file with journal).
3
For a count of the number of federal appellate judgeships and when they were added, see
Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships - Courts of Appeals, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/authorized-judgeships/chronological-history-authorizedjudgeships-courts-appeals [https://perma.cc/7NJJ-S64V].
4
See id.
5
See, e.g., Peter S. Menell & Ryan Vacca, Revisiting and Confronting the Federal Judiciary
Capacity “Crisis”: Charting a Path for Federal Judiciary Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 789, 853 (2020)
(noting that the average number of cases per active judge increased from 148 in 1971 to 324 in 2017).
These figures do not include the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, but the inclusion
of filings in that court paints essentially the same picture. See infra Section I.A.
6
Numerous court studies over the past fifty years have ended with calls for expanding the federal
appellate bench, including an American Bar Foundation Committee in the 1960s, the Hruska Commission
in the 1970s, the Federal Courts Study Committee in the 1980s, and the White Commission in the 1990s.
See infra Section I.A. The Judicial Conference of the United States has also consistently requested
additional judgeships in the last few decades. See infra note 143; see also Press Release, Admin. Off. of
the U.S. Cts., Judicial Conference Seeks New Judgeships – Adequate Compensation for Judges and
Others (Mar. 16, 1999), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/1999/03/16/judicial-conference-seeks-newjudgeships-adequate-compensation-judges-and-others [https://perma.cc/U4KB-6K7U] (noting that the
Judicial Conference would request an additional seven permanent and four temporary judgeships in the
courts of appeals); Press Release, Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Federal Judiciary Says New Judgeships
Needed (Mar. 13, 2007), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2007/03/13/federal-judiciary-says-newjudgeships-needed [https://perma.cc/54F4-W6VG] (noting that the Judicial Conference would ask
Congress to create fifteen new judgeships for the courts of appeals).
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There are a few reasons, though, why the prospect of creating a bevy of
new appellate judgeships is not an altogether welcome one. The first
concerns logistics. Given that we are not “paint[ing] on a blank canvas,”7
one has to consider how to go about adding new judgeships to the court
system we already have in place. Specifically, should judgeships simply be
added to existing circuits? At what point should we consider adding new
circuits, out of a concern that existing ones will become too big, thereby
threatening uniformity of law through a lack of intracircuit consistency?8
This concern grows if circuits become so large that they cannot have a single
functioning en banc court.9 And at what point should we worry about having
too many circuits, which will invariably create more intercircuit conflicts and
potentially lead to the fragmentation of the federal judiciary?10
The second reason concerns politics. In the run-up to the 2020 elections,
there were numerous calls to expand the Supreme Court, premised on

7
Cf. Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257–58 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.) (noting that “[i]n outlining the
contours of th[e] slim category” of state law cases that nevertheless “arise[] under federal law” for
purposes of federal question jurisdiction, the Court “do[es] not paint on a blank canvas,” and
“[u]nfortunately, the canvas looks like one that Jackson Pollock got to first”).
8
See Hearing on Oversight of the Structure of the Federal Courts Before the Subcomm. on Oversight,
Agency Action, Fed. Rights & Fed. Cts. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 10–11 (2018)
(statement of Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/07-31-18%20Fitzpatrick%20Testimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/327L-WA6T] (addressing the question of when a court of appeals has become “too big”
and concluding that the Ninth Circuit in particular “has become so big that it no longer delivers on th[e]
promise of uniformity” due to the fact that “three-judge panels on the Ninth Circuit issue so many
decisions that the other judges on the court cannot keep up with them all” leading to “many complaints
that different three-judge panels within the Ninth Circuit confront the same legal issue and decide it
differently because they are unaware that another panel is confronting or has confronted the same issue”).
9
By statute, an en banc court consists of all active judges of a court and any senior judge who was a
member of the panel whose decision is being reheard, 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), except that a court with more
than fifteen active judges may determine by local rule the number of judges that serve on an en banc
court, Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633. Only the Ninth Circuit has
implemented this exception. An en banc court in that circuit consists of the chief judge and ten other
active judges selected at random. See 9TH CIR. R. 35-3.
The Ninth Circuit’s limited en banc court is said to have a number of significant problems, including
that a majority of the en banc can reach a decision that is at odds with what the majority of the court as a
whole believes is the right result, that off-panel judges may not be aware of an imminent en banc opinion
that could affect pending decisions (undermining uniformity of law), and off-panel judges may not feel
as invested in a given en banc opinion and so feel less compunction about “chipping away” at it in
subsequent opinions (also undermining uniformity of law). Pamela Ann Rymer, The “Limited” En Banc:
Half Full, or Half Empty?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 321–23 (2006).
10
Concerns about precisely how many judges would be added to the bench, among others, have
caused some judges to speak out against expanding the courts. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The
Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORY L.J. 1147, 1177–78 (1994); Jon O. Newman,
1,000 Judges—The Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciary, 76 JUDICATURE 187, 188 (1993).
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Democrats winning the presidency and Senate.11 Correspondingly, there
were calls for resisting such “court packing.”12 If the Democrats do gain a
majority in the Senate in the near future,13 it is only a matter of time until this
debate spills over to the courts of appeals,14 particularly given the claims that
the intermediate appellate courts have been “packed” with a large number of
appointees by President Trump15—fifty-three or nearly 30% of authorized

11
See, e.g., Elaine Godfrey, The Democrats’ Supreme Court Hail Mary, ATLANTIC (Sept. 28, 2020,
10:11
AM),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/09/democrats-case-courtpacking/616446/ [https://perma.cc/V68H-BT8S] (explaining the various arguments in favor of packing
the Court); Evan Gerstmann, If the Democrats Regain Power, They Should Pack the Supreme Court.
Here’s Why., FORBES (Sept. 27, 2020, 5:47 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/evangerstmann/2020/09/
27/if-the-democrats-regain-power-they-should-pack-the-supreme-court-heres-why/#77b5d9073644
[https://perma.cc/7PEF-F8GV] (arguing that adding more seats would result in a more ideologically
balanced Court); Elie Mystal, There Is Only One Way out of This Crisis: Expand the Court, NATION
(Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/supreme-court-packing/ [https://perma.cc/
AS2V-4D43] (arguing that expanding the Supreme Court would be the only way to rectify the imbalance
brought on by the Republicans’ “theft” of at least two seats); Sam Stein, Eric Holder Says Next
Democratic President Should Consider Court Packing, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 7, 2019, 7:20 PM),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/eric-holder-says-next-democratic-president-should-consider-courtpacking [https://perma.cc/9XA9-EPZY] (noting that former Attorney General Eric Holder stated that
Democrats should consider packing the Supreme Court given what he saw as unprecedented obstruction
on the part of Senator Mitch McConnell specifically and Senate Republicans generally); see also Marin
K. Levy, Packing and Unpacking State Courts, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121, 1124–25 (2020) (noting
how several candidates running for the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination stated that they would
be open to increasing the size of the Supreme Court).
12
Such calls have come from those on the political right and the political left. See, e.g., Henry Olsen,
Packing the Supreme Court Is a Horrible Idea. Democrats Must Reject It., WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2020,
2:18 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/09/21/packing-supreme-court-is-horribleidea-democrats-must-reject-it/ [https://perma.cc/4CCX-X2ZG] (arguing that packing the Court would
undermine the independence of the judiciary); Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, Reform the Court, but
Don’t Pack It, ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/08/reform-thecourt-but-dont-pack-it/614986/ [https://perma.cc/6R69-LEZR] (arguing that the Court should be
disempowered by “transferring some of its existing authority to the democratically accountable branches”
rather than expanded).
13
At the time of this Essay’s writing, the outcomes of the two Georgia runoff elections that will
determine control of the Senate are not known. See Shane Goldmacher, With Senate Control Hanging in
Balance, ‘Crazytown’ Cash Floods Georgia, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/20
20/11/19/us/politics/georgia-senate-races-donations.html [https://perma.cc/346Y-XNG2].
14
Indeed, one prominent federal courts scholar has just argued for the expansion of the lower courts.
See Leah Litman, Opinion, Expand the Lower Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/10/27/opinion/supreme-court-reform.html
[https://perma.cc/Q8DJ-KG2V].
15
See, e.g., Nathan R. Hardy & Richard L. Jolly, Opinion, Trump Has Packed the Courts with RightWing Ideologues. Democrats, What’s Your Plan?, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2019, 12:15 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-12-18/donald-trump-judges-federal-courts-conservatives
[https://perma.cc/429Y-2DH3] (arguing that Democrats should pursue judicial reforms in response to
Republicans “reshap[ing]” the federal judiciary with hundreds of appointments).
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appellate judgeships.16 It therefore seems safe to surmise that any attempt to
substantially expand the courts of appeals would be cast as politically
motivated, and the lower courts could suffer for it.17 If Democrats do not gain
a clear majority in the Senate in the near future, Congress may continue the
trend of the last three decades and no new judgeships will be forthcoming.
And so, if the answer to the question about the ideal size of the courts
of appeals is “bigger than it currently is,” it would seem that there are no
easy fixes. But this does not mean that there are no fixes full stop. Indeed,
there is at least one fix that is easier than might appear at first blush. This
brings us to the topic of senior judges. As any student (or practitioner) of the
federal courts knows, senior judges are a special class of judges who have
left regular active service and yet still decide appeals as members of the
court.18 “Taking senior status,” among other things, permits judges to elect
the percent of an active judge’s full caseload they will take on19—with a
recent average of between 40% and 50%.20 But the key point is that in
addition to “ameliorat[ing] the problems of expanding caseloads”21 with their
16
See Russell Wheeler, Trump’s 200th Judicial Appointment: Less than Meets the Eye, BROOKINGS
(June 26, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/06/26/trumps-200th-judicial-appointment
-less-than-meets-the-eye/ [https://perma.cc/9KWC-DKSA].
17
Scholars have made the point that packing the Supreme Court could harm its perceived or
sociological legitimacy—that is, the extent to which the public respects the institution. See, e.g., Tara
Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2240, 2273–75 (2019)
(reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT (2018)) (arguing
that packing the Supreme Court could harm its sociological legitimacy); Neil Siegel, The AntiConstitutionality of Court-Packing, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 26, 2019, 10:29 AM),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/03/the-anti-constitutionality-of-court_36.html [https://perma.cc/BP5JWTQ6] (“[P]acking the Court would substantially increase the public perception that the Court is partisan
and political in just the way, and to the same extent, that Congress is, and so would risk jettisoning the
significant amount of diffuse support that the Court retains.”). By extension, the same could be true of
the lower courts.
18
See 28 U.S.C. § 371. Taking senior status stands in contrast to retiring (when a judge leaves the
bench while receiving a pension) and resigning outright (when a judge leaves office without further
compensation). See id. §§ 371–73; see also Stephen B. Burbank, S. Jay Plager & Gregory Ablavsky,
Leaving the Bench, 1970–2009: The Choices Federal Judges Make, What Influences Those Choices, and
Their Consequences, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 n.7 (2012) (explaining the differences between resignation,
retirement, and assuming senior status).
19
See 28 U.S.C. § 294(b).
20
See Burbank et al., supra note 18, at 29 (estimating that, on average, senior circuit judges were
carrying a 43.9% caseload in the 1990s and a 45.1% caseload in the 2000s, but then noting that the latter
figure could be closer to 53% if senior judges without chambers and staff (who likely do negligible work)
are excluded); see also Frederic Block, Senior Status: An “Active” Senior Judge Corrects Some Common
Misunderstandings, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 533, 540 (2007) (finding comparable figures when looking at
senior circuit and district judges).
21
David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 453,
455 (2007).
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continued service, by assuming senior status, each judge also creates a
vacancy to be filled by a new active judge.22 Therein lies the promise of
senior judges.
If there were a sufficiently large number of active judges who could
take senior status but had not yet done so—and existing barriers to “going
senior” could be lowered—a significant number of vacancies could be
created and then filled with new judges. These additions would come without
expanding the size of each circuit’s en banc court (as those courts generally
are composed of active judges only23)—and so concerns about disuniformity
in law would be allayed.24 Moreover, these additions in “judge power” could
be gained without complex negotiations over how to add new judgeships and
would be less politicized than adding seats outright.
Beginning with the first proposition, at last count, more than sixty active
judges were eligible to assume senior status.25 In other words, approximately
one-third of the current active judges could become senior judges and create
a substantial number of vacancies. Regarding the second proposition, those
outside of the judiciary might think that taking senior status does not mean
much functionally for a judge, apart from giving him or her the ability to take
a reduced caseload. As it turns out, senior status can come with several
significant changes to one’s judicial life—although, as even some inside the
judiciary do not know, those changes vary from circuit to circuit.
While not publicized and not widely known outside of individual
courts, as Judge Jon O. Newman and I learned for a book project on the
internal workings of the courts of appeals,26 in some circuits senior judges
22

See 28 U.S.C. § 371(d).
The one exception is that a senior judge who was a member of the panel whose decision is being
reheard may choose to serve on the en banc court. Id. § 46(c).
24
As noted earlier, there are concerns that once a court becomes so big that it can rehear appeals only
in limited en banc panels, uniformity of law will be undermined. See supra note 9 and accompanying
text. This proposal avoids adding to the number of active judges, thereby leaving current en banc courts
intact. See infra Part III.
25
I arrived at this figure after reviewing the Judicial Center’s Judicial Biographical Directory and
determining which current active judges had already satisfied the Rule of 80 based upon their birthdate
and commission date. See Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges: Export, FED. JUD. CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/biographical-directory-article-iii-federal-judges-export
[https://perma.cc/7G74-Y7QN] (using data from the file titled “Format 1: Organized by Judge (Flat
File)”). This is also consistent with Russell Wheeler’s findings from two years ago. See Russell Wheeler,
Appellate Court Vacancies May Be Scarce in Coming Years, Limiting Trump’s Impact, BROOKINGS (Dec.
6,
2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/12/06/trump-impact-on-appellate-courts/
[https://perma.cc/TN2X-UMAG] (estimating that seventy-one appellate judges would be eligible as of
July 1, 2020).
26
JON O. NEWMAN & MARIN K. LEVY, THE INTERNAL OPERATIONS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS OF
APPEALS (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
23
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are not permitted to vote on court rules.27 Additionally, in at least one circuit,
senior judges may have to give up their chambers—where they may have
spent decades of their working life—and move to less convenient spaces.28
Judges have also spoken about a loss in status that comes with becoming
senior in some courts—for example, being assigned to sit at the ends of the
bench during ceremonial events, beyond even the most junior active judges.29
In the other direction, some chief judges have noted that they endeavor to
treat senior judges as well as possible so as to encourage eligible active
judges to take senior status, all to create more vacancies.30 In these circuits,
senior judges not only retain their chambers and place at court functions, but
their standing is also improved in other respects.31 For example, senior judges
may be given their first pick of opinions to author coming out of sittings, and
their preferences for when they would like to sit are honored before those of
active judges.32
By documenting all of these aspects of senior status, this Essay hopes
to make contributions to an important and growing literature, as well as a
critical and timely debate. First, as with the larger book project, it hopes to
provide a detailed account of the variation in how senior judges are treated
across circuits as part of an emerging body of scholarship about the
judiciary’s internal operations—in part for the judiciary. And second, it
hopes to contribute to the current debate about expanding the courts of
appeals by providing at least one path forward—a path based on moving
more circuits towards adopting practices that would make taking senior
status more attractive, thereby creating new vacancies. To be sure, the
solution is not a complete one. Not all eligible judges would be persuaded to
become senior even if all of the barriers noted here were eliminated,
including those who are intent upon waiting until a president of their party is
in the White House and can nominate their successor. That said, if even a
quarter of eligible active judges became inclined to take senior status, fifteen
new judgeships would become available—more than in the last bill to
expand the federal courts of appeals, passed thirty years ago.33
27

See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
29
See infra Part II.
30
See infra Part II; NEWMAN & LEVY, supra note 26 (discussing data from an interview regarding
the Second Circuit, conducted on February 14 and February 24, 2020) (transcript on file with author).
31
See infra Part II.
32
See infra Part II.
33
The 1990 Judgeship Bill was the last major expansion of the courts of appeals, in which Congress
created eleven new circuit judgeships. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650,
§ 202(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5098–99.
28
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The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I begins with a brief background
on the expansion of the courts of appeals over time. It further details how
judges, scholars, and members of Congress have wrestled with whether more
judgeships should be added and, if so, how. It then turns to the role of senior
judges. Building upon the foundational work of Steve Burbank, S. Jay
Plager, and Gregory Ablavksy,34 along with David Stras and Ryan Scott,35
this Essay considers when “senior judges” as such were created, the impact
of such judges today, and statistics regarding the active judges who are
currently eligible to “go senior.” Part II then turns to new data, gathered by
surveying court administrators and interviewing twenty current and past
chief judges of all of the federal courts of appeals, regarding the rules and
policies on senior judges in each circuit. Finally, Part III makes several
reform proposals, all in the service of making senior status more attractive,
with the ultimate goal of creating vacancies to provide more judge power to
the federal judiciary.
OVERVIEW: THE SIZE OF THE COURTS OF APPEALS AND THE ROLE OF
SENIOR JUDGES
A. The Courts of Appeals
It took over one hundred years from the time Congress created the
original circuit courts, in 1789,36 to create a structure of modern courts of
appeals.37 And then, Congress could not help but quickly enlarge its new
creation. Only two years after the Evarts Act, the statute that gave life to nine
intermediate appellate courts,38 Congress added another—what would
eventually be styled the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.39 The Tenth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals were
later created in 192940 and 1980,41 respectively. And the United States Court

34

See Burbank et al., supra note 18.
See Stras & Scott, supra note 21.
36
See Judiciary Act of 1789, Pub. L. No. 1-20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74–75.
37
See Evarts Act, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, 826–27 (1891).
38
See id.
39
See Act of Feb. 9, 1893, ch. 74, 27 Stat. 434, 434–35.
40
Specifically, in 1929 Congress created the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
See Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 363, 45 Stat. 1346, 1346–47.
41
In 1980, Congress created the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit out of the
old Fifth Circuit. See Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, § 2,
94 Stat. 1994, 1994.
35
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of Appeals for the Federal Circuit followed in 198242 out of what had earlier
been the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.43
It is not only the number of courts that has grown, but also the number
of judges who sit on each court. Before the passage of the Evarts Act,
Congress had created dedicated “circuit judges,” one for each circuit, to sit,
alongside district judges and Supreme Court Justices, on the then-nine circuit
courts (the precursors to the modern courts of appeals).44 One additional
circuit judge was later bestowed upon the Second Circuit alone in 1887.45 To
this stable of ten judges, Congress authorized the addition of nine more—
again, one for each of the then-nine circuits—through the Evarts Act itself
in 1891.46 For the next hundred years, almost no decade went by without the
addition of new seats to the federal appellate bench.47 And in that time, the
total number of appellate judges expanded from the original 19 to 179.48 But
that expansion stopped after the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, which
created eleven new circuit judgeships.49 The federal courts of appeals have
now been held at that size for thirty years.50
The expansions of the federal bench—when they occurred—were
generally on account of an expanding docket. As I have chronicled
elsewhere, the courts of appeals have been defined by a rapidly rising
caseload for much of their collective life.51 In 1892, just one year after the

42

Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, §§ 101, 165, 96 Stat. 25, 25, 50.
See Act of Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 488, 45 Stat. 1475. For more details on the history of the courts of
appeals, see generally Newman, supra note 2.
44
An Act to Amend the Judicial System of the United States, ch. 22, § 2, 16 Stat. 44, 44–45 (1869).
For more on the circuit courts, see generally Joshua Glick, Note, On the Road: The Supreme Court and
the History of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1753 (2003), providing a thorough historical account
of circuit riding, and David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride Circuit Again, 91 MINN.
L. REV. 1710 (2007), describing the practice of circuit riding, the conditions that finally led to its end,
and advocating for its revival.
45
Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 347, 24 Stat. 492.
46
Evarts Act, ch. 517, §§ 1–2, 26 Stat. 826, 826–27 (1891).
47
See Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships - Courts of Appeals, supra note 3. The only
decade in which judges were not added to the bench between 1891 and 1990 is the 1910s. Id.
48
See id.
49
See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 202(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5098–99.
50
It is worth noting that while the overall size has held constant at 179 judgeships, one of those
judgeships was transferred from the D.C. Circuit to the Ninth Circuit, effective January 21, 2009. Court
Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, § 509(a), 121 Stat. 2534, 2543.
51
See, e.g., Marin K. Levy, Judging Justice on Appeal, 123 YALE L.J. 2386, 2393–2402 (2014)
(reviewing WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE UNITED
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS (2012)); Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals:
Uniformity and Case Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 320–25 (2011) [hereinafter
Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals].
43
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courts were formed, there was an average of 44 filings per judgeship.52 That
number had jumped to 73 by 1950 (even while the number of judgeships had
grown from 19 to 75) and jumped again to 137 by 1978 (when the number
of judgeships stood at 144).53 Only a little over a decade later, in 1990, filings
per judgeship had risen to 237.54
During this time, judges and scholars alike referred to the “crisis” in
volume at the courts of appeals,55 but the expansion of the federal bench
stopped in 1990.56 And the workload did not slow. In 1997 it reached 300
filings per judgeship57 and hit its high-water mark in 2006 with just over 400
filings per judgeship.58 The caseload has receded in the last decade; it now
stands at about 288 filings per judgeship.59 But it still remains well above
52
See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTS. FOR THE FED. CTS. OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT 14 (1998)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
53
See id.
54
See id.
55
See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 634,
634–35 (1974); DANIEL J. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF
VOLUME (1974); see also Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1112 & n.9 (2011)
(noting that the “crisis in volume” literature dates back to the 1960s, and citing the sources noted above
as well as first citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and
Workload of Federal Judges, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 7–13 (1983); then citing Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Are
the Federal Courts Becoming Bureaucracies?, 68 A.B.A. J. 1370, 1371 (1982); and then citing Charles
Alan Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administration, 42 TEX. L. REV. 949,
949 (1964)).
56
See Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships - Courts of Appeals, supra note 3 (providing
“dates and legislative authority for establishment, realignment, and creation of additional judgeships for
the U.S. Courts of Appeals”). Just note, again, that one judgeship was reassigned from the D.C. Circuit
to the Ninth Circuit, effective January 21, 2009. See supra note 50.
57
FINAL REPORT, supra note 52, at 14.
58
This figure was arrived at by combining two data tables from the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts. The first table notes that there were 70,375 filings during the twelve-month period ending March
31, 2006 in the twelve regional circuit courts of appeals. U.S. Courts of Appeals – Appeals Commenced,
Terminated, and Pending During the 12-Month Periods Ending March 31, 2005 and 2006, ADMIN. OFF.
OF THE U.S. CTS., tbl.B (2006), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/
B00Mar06.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6LX-EUWE]. The second notes that there were 1,613 appeals filed in
this same timeframe in the Federal Circuit. U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Federal Circuit – Appeals
Filed, Terminated, and Pending During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2006, ADMIN. OFF. OF
THE U.S. CTS., tbl.B-8 (2006), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/
B08Mar06.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2ZL-XKR3]. The two figures combined—71,988—divided by the
number of federal appellate judgeships—179—equals approximately 402 filings per judgeship.
59
This figure was arrived at by combining two data tables from the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts. The first notes that there were 50,258 filings during the twelve-month period ending March 31,
2020 in the twelve regional circuit courts of appeals. U.S. Courts of Appeals – Cases Commenced,
Terminated, and Pending During the 12-Month Periods Ending March 31, 2019 and 2020, ADMIN. OFF.
OF THE U.S. CTS., tbl.B (2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/b/federal-judicial-caseloadstatistics/2020/03/31 [https://perma.cc/3ULV-VAYJ]. The second notes that there were 1,435 appeals
filed in this same timeframe in the Federal Circuit. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit –
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where it was in 1990, the last time the federal courts of appeals were
expanded.
Throughout this time, judges, court administrators, academics, and
members of Congress have wrestled with difficult questions of calibration,
including just how many judges are needed to populate the courts of appeals.
As others have well documented before, a series of working groups and
commissions were formed in the latter half of the twentieth century to
consider court reform, including how the appellate courts should respond to
their rising caseload.60 A 1968 report by the American Bar Foundation,
pointedly titled Accommodating the Workload of the United States Courts of
Appeals, noted both the need for, but also difficulties inherent in, expanding
those appellate courts.61 Specifically, the Committee, led by Paul Carrington
and including such distinguished members as Justice Thurgood Marshall,
stated in the report that “it should be recognized that the expansion of the
number of judges on a court, even though gradual in time, changes the nature
of a court.”62 They ultimately suggested, among other things, adding judges
to existing circuits but then giving consideration to splitting the courts after
a threshold of fifteen active judges was reached.63
From there, a different committee or commission considered the
problem in each of the subsequent decades, with the Commission on
Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (also known as the Hruska
Commission) in the 1970s,64 the Federal Courts Study Committee in the
1980s,65 and the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal
Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2020, ADMIN.
OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., tbl.B-8 (2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/b-8/federal-judicialcaseload-statistics/2020/03/31 [https://perma.cc/R34Y-7KYV]. The two figures combined—51,694—
divided by the number of federal appellate judgeships—179—equals approximately 288 filings per
judgeship.
60
See Menell & Vacca, supra note 5, at 813–41.
61
See AM. BAR FOUND., ACCOMMODATING THE WORKLOAD OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF
APPEALS 5 (1968).
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
See Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807, 807. For the Commission’s final report,
see ROMAN L. HRUSKA ET AL., COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. CT. APP. SYS., STRUCTURE AND
INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975) [hereinafter HRUSKA COMMISSION
REPORT
II],
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0019/4520540.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P9YF-C59M].
65
See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 101–09, 102 Stat.
4642, 4644–45 (1988). For the Committee’s final report, see FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., JUD. CONF. OF
THE U.S., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY
COMMITTEE
REPORT],
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/RepFCSC.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2GED-6KP9].
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Courts of Appeals (also known as the White Commission) in the 1990s.66
Each committee and commission stated that more judges were needed, but
acknowledged how complex the task of adding them would be. The White
Commission summed up the “conundrum” facing the courts of appeals thus:
On the one hand, if they do not obtain more judge power, they risk
unacceptable backlogs of pending cases or an unacceptable decline in the
quantity and quality of judicial attention paid to the cases they decide. On
the other hand, adding too many judges to a court that must act collegially
may heighten the likelihood of incoherence in the law.67

Such incoherence would be exacerbated, it was said, if a court grew too large
to have functional en banc review.68 The various committees and
commissions ultimately made different reform proposals. Most notably, the
Hruska Commission recommended that Congress split the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits69 and establish a National Court of Appeals, which would be placed
between the Supreme Court and regional circuit courts and consist of a small
cadre of judges who could help resolve splits that arose from the courts of
appeals.70 (There was initial enthusiasm for several of these plans, but the
proposal for the National Court of Appeals stalled after several prominent
judges came out strongly against it.71) One point of consensus among the
Hruska Commission and the Federal Courts Study Committee was that the
66

See Act of Nov. 26, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305(a)(1), 111 Stat. 2440, 2491. For the
Commission’s final report, see FINAL REPORT, supra note 52.
67
FINAL REPORT, supra note 52, at 59–60; see also HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT II, supra note 64,
at ix (noting that “[t]he creation of additional appellate judgeships” would be necessary, but cautioning
that “an appellate court composed of more than nine judgeships loses in efficiency and in the collegiality
essential to the optimum functioning of the judicial process”); FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 65, at 117 (“Courts of appeals of twenty, thirty and even forty or more judges—
distinct possibilities if caseloads continue to rise at present rates—may well be too large to provide the
necessary coherency of case law within their circuits.”).
68
See HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT II, supra note 64, at 60 (“The major problems of managing a
large circuit arise primarily in connection with en banc proceedings.”); FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 65, at 115 (“The growth in the number of circuit judges is likely to
continue, increasing the potential for in banc courts of unwieldy size.”); FINAL REPORT, supra note 52, at
61 (“[W]hen an appellate court operating as a single decisional unit reaches eighteen judgeships, the en
banc process becomes too cumbersome to be feasible . . . .”).
69
See ROMAN L. HRUSKA ET AL., COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. CT. APP. SYS., THE
GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
3–4 (1973) [hereinafter HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT I].
70
See HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT II, supra note 64, at 5–39.
71
See Menell & Vacca, supra note 5, at 822–23 (describing initial support for the National Court of
Appeals and then a later set of hearings that included “mixed reactions from federal appellate judges,”
such as Judge Henry Friendly, who was “staunchly opposed” to the establishment of the court, and how
the reform effort then lost momentum).
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successful functioning of the courts of appeals into the future would require
the assistance of senior judges, as they were a vital source of workload
support, and the courts therefore could not afford to make senior status
undesirable.72
B. Senior Judges
There was no such thing as a senior judge when Congress created the
old circuit courts in 1789.73 And there was still no such thing as a senior judge
when Congress created the modern federal appellate courts just over a
hundred years later.74 But in the intervening years, Congress had created a
pension system. Concerned by the prospect of judges remaining on the bench
past the point they were fit for service, Congress enacted a statute that
permitted judges of seventy years or older to “receive the same salary which
was by law payable to [them] at the time of [their] resignation” if they had
served for ten years.75 But, as Burbank, Plager, and Ablavsky have
thoughtfully detailed, resignation was the only option other than active
service.76 There was no middle ground.
In 1919 that changed.77 Congress created a new option for judges who
had reached retirement age: they could elect to leave active service but
continue to decide cases and perform other judicial duties (while still
receiving a full pension).78 And the President could then appoint the judge’s
72
See HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT II, supra note 64, at 64 (“In short, for the home circuit, senior
judges offer the potential for significant contribution to the judge power of the court without the attendant
disadvantages which typically accompany use of district court judges or an increase in the number of
active judges on the court . . . . The Commission recommends a modest easing of the requirements for
taking senior status.”); FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 65, at 154 (“Congress
should not enact disincentives to senior judge service. Effective federal court operations require
maintaining the incentives that the current senior judge system affords.”). The Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals acknowledged the contribution of senior judges by noting
that they were needed to fill out various panels but did not explicitly say that assuming senior status
should be encouraged. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 52, at 48.
73
The original circuit courts were created in the first Judiciary Act. See Judiciary Act of 1789, Pub.
L. No. 1-20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74–75. At that time, and for the following eighty years, “senior judges,” as
they are called today, did not exist. See Burbank et al., supra note 18, at 4 (“During the first eighty years
of the national government, there were three ways to leave the federal bench: removal following
conviction after trial on articles of impeachment, resignation, and death.”).
74
See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, 826–27.
75
See Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, § 5, 16 Stat. 44, 45 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 371(a)).
76
See Burbank et al., supra note 18, at 7–8.
77
See Act of Feb. 25, 1919, ch. 29, § 6, 40 Stat. 1156, 1157–58.
78
See id. (“[I]nstead of resigning, any judge other than a justice of the Supreme Court, who is
qualified to resign under the foregoing provisions, may retire, upon the salary of which he is then in
receipt, from regular active service on the bench, and the President shall thereupon be authorized to
appoint a successor; but a judge so retiring may nevertheless be called upon by the senior circuit judge of
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successor.79 Originally considered in 1869,80 this middle ground was thought
of as a clear “win-win” fifty years later. As the report from the House
Judiciary Committee on 65 HR 12001 put it, “It is believed that the
enactment of this provision will lead to further efficiency of the Federal
courts without adding anything whatever in the way of expense for the
additional services.”81 The bill was enacted into law in February 1919.82
The general outline of what today is called “senior status” has remained
in place for the past hundred years, with a few modifications. One such
modification concerns nomenclature. The term “senior judge” only came
into use in 1958; previously, such judges were referred to as “retired
judges.”83 (Earlier, the “senior circuit judge” of each appellate court, the
presiding judge of the court, was the judge in regular active service with the
greatest seniority; in 1948, that position morphed into the “chief judge,”84
making the label “senior judge” available for the taking.) Another
modification concerns eligibility. In 1937, senior status was extended to
Supreme Court Justices.85 However, while such Justices were and are today
permitted to sit by designation on the lower courts, they may not continue to

that circuit and be by him authorized to perform such judicial duties in such circuit as such retired judge
may be willing to undertake . . . .”).
79
See id.
80
See Burbank et al., supra note 18, at 8 (noting that permitting judges to leave regular active service
but still hear cases was considered in the debate over the 1869 Judiciary Act and, indeed, written into the
House bill, but was ultimately rejected “over the possibility of having twenty sitting Supreme Court
Justices and discomfort over forcing superannuated judges to continue to work”).
81
H.R. REP. NO. 65-573, at 6 (1918).
82
See Act of Feb. 25, 1919 § 7, 40 Stat. 1156, 1158.
83
See Act of Aug. 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-755, § 5, 72 Stat. 848, 849.
84
See Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, §45, 62 Stat. 869, 871; see also Marin K. Levy &
Jon O. Newman, The Office of the Chief Judge, 170 U. PA L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (discussing the
origin and significance of the role “chief judge”).
85
See Act of Mar. 1, 1937, ch. 21, 50 Stat. 24, 24.
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hear cases at the Supreme Court.86 And unlike their lower court counterparts,
such Justices are not referred to as “senior,” but as “retired.”87
More generally, as Burbank, Plager, and Ablavsky have argued, the role
of senior judge shifted during this time from a semiretired judge who could
assist a court on an emergency basis—like a judge sitting by designation88—
to one who could routinely decide cases, albeit, at the senior judge’s election,
fewer cases than heard by their active colleagues.89 As part of this shift, the
requirements for attaining senior status were relaxed. Whereas previously
judges could only take senior status at or after the age of seventy as long as
they had served on the bench for ten years or more, beginning in 1954 judges
could do the same at or after the age of sixty-five with fifteen or more years
of service.90 Thirty years later the requirements were relaxed further—
starting then, and continuing on through today, a judge can assume senior
status at the age of sixty-five or after provided that their age plus their years
on the federal bench equals eighty or more91 (the so-called “Rule of 80”92).
The financial incentives increased as well. Based on a 1948 law, senior
judges today who complete a sufficiently substantial amount of work enjoy
the “salary of the office”—meaning that they enjoy pay raises and cost-ofliving adjustments alongside their active counterparts.93

86
See id.; see also Stras & Scott, supra note 21, at 474; Demography of Article III Judges, 17892017, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/age-and-experience-judges
[https://perma.cc/6PZX-HC68] (“Congress extended [the option of senior status] to Supreme Court
justices in 1937, although justices following this path . . . do not continue to decide cases at the Supreme
Court level.”).
Several of the current Supreme Court reform proposals rest on the idea of a number of current Justices
becoming “senior Justices” and taking a reduced judicial role. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Opinion, Pack the
Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/10/27/opinion/supremecourt-reform.html#kramer [https://perma.cc/Y4CX-RUAF]; Jack Balkin, Don’t Pack the Court,
Regularize
Appointments,
BALKINIZATION
(Oct.
5,
2020,
11:00
AM),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2020/10/dont-pack-court-regularize-appointments.html
[https://perma.cc/HJV4-9TRT].
87
See Demography of Article III Judges, 1789-2017, supra note 86.
88
See generally Marin K. Levy, Visiting Judges, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 67 (2019) [hereinafter Levy,
Visiting Judges] (detailing the practice of sitting by designation at the federal courts of appeals).
89
See Burbank et al., supra note 18, at 91–92.
90
Act of Feb. 10, 1954, Pub. L. No. 294, § 4, 68 Stat. 8, 12.
91
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 204, 98 Stat.
333, 350. It should be noted that the Rule of 80 is capped at 70 years of age and 10 years of service. 28
U.S.C. § 371(c).
92
See Demography of Article III Judges, 1789-2017, supra note 86.
93
See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, §§ 294, 371, 372, 62 Stat. 869, 901, 903–04. To be eligible,
senior judges can, among other things, assume a workload equal to or greater than 25% of an active
judge’s workload. See Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, § 705, 103 Stat. 1716, 1770.
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These various laws together create the framework of assuming senior
status in the modern day.94 Again, when judges satisfy the Rule of 80, they
may elect to take senior status and, in so doing, decide what percentage of
an active judge’s work to take on.95 (Though, they must work at least a
quarter of an active judge’s workload to be eligible for salary increases and
must have the chief judge of their court certify that they have met that
threshold.96) And they may maintain a set of chambers and staff, though the
number of staff they are allotted generally depends upon the workload they
take on each year.97 Today, there are more than one hundred senior judges in
the federal courts of appeals,98 and according to the most recent statistical
tables from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, resident senior
judges participated in nearly 25% of all cases in the past year.99
Part of why a good number of judges have elected to take senior status
is that the statutory scheme provides considerable financial advantages for
doing so. Specifically, the income senior judges earn is not subject to social
security taxes,100 nor is it subject to income taxes in many states.101

94
A few commentators have stressed how complicated this framework is. See, e.g., Stras & Scott,
supra note 21, at 459 (noting that “[v]ery few people . . . understand the complex set of statutes that
authorizes and regulates senior status”).
95
See 28 U.S.C. § 371(c), (e)(1); Stras & Scott, supra note 21, at 470–71.
96
See 28 U.S.C. § 371(e)(1). Senior judges may also perform judicial duties outside of their circuit
when designated and assigned by the Chief Justice of the United States. See id. § 294(d).
97
In 1950, the Judicial Conference resolved that the judicial council of each circuit should set the
standards for the allowable staff of senior judges. See Burbank et al., supra note 18, at 40 (citing ADMIN.
OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 22 (1950), http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Proceedings/Procee
dings.aspx?doc=/uscourts/FederalCourts/judconf/proceedings/1950-09.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4RVXYTXP]). A few circuits have their own policies regarding staffing. For example, senior judges are
“generally” permitted two law clerks in the Eighth Circuit. See U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH
CIR., INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES 5 (2019), https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/newrules/coa/IOP.pdf
[https://perma.cc/22LA-HMGT].
98
This figure was arrived at by examining the Federal Judicial Center’s Biographical Directory of
Article III Judges. See Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges: Export, supra note 25.
99
ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES tbl.2.6 (2019),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jff_2.6_0930.2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CN89XYP].
100
See 26 U.S.C. § 3121(i)(5).
101
See Scott & Stras, supra note 21, at 461 (first citing 26 U.S.C. § 3121(a)(5)(B) (excluding annuity
plans from the definition of “wages” taxable under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA)); then
citing id. § 3121(i)(5) (excluding payments to retired judges from the definition of “wages” taxable under
FICA); and then citing Darryl Van Duch, Senior Judge Ranks Close Vacancy Gap, NAT’L L.J., July 22,
1996, at A22).
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Additionally, the provision that limits outside income for teaching to 15% of
a judge’s salary102 does not apply to senior judges.103
But there are some potential drawbacks as well—namely, as non-active
judges, senior judges are not permitted to decide cases as part of an en banc
court unless they were on the original panel that heard the case at hand.104
One might wonder why not being allowed to participate in en banc review
should be considered a drawback—after all, en banc hearings can be quite
time-consuming and acrimonious.105 One might also wonder how relevant
such a drawback—assuming it is a drawback—is, given that en banc review
happens infrequently, with less than 1% of appeals decided by the court as a
whole.106 Part of the reason being excluded from en banc review is considered
such a downside to taking senior status concerns the import of the cases that
go en banc; as Burbank, Plager, and Ablavsky have noted, en banc hearings
provide “one of the major vehicles for creating new or particularly important
law at the circuit level.”107 Another part is that by being a member of the en
banc court (and by being able to vote to take cases en banc), judges have an
avenue for trying to reverse a panel decision that they find objectionable.108
More subtly, there is the dynamic that exists in the shadow of en banc
review—namely, that judges can help shape the law of their circuit by
keeping alive the possibility that they might go en banc on a particular matter
(thereby affecting the panel members’ behavior in the first instance).
Accordingly, this statutory prohibition is generally understood to be a
significant drawback to “going senior.”109
While this statutory regime might seem comprehensive, it in fact leaves
open a number of different matters—matters that can create additional
incentives or disincentives for taking senior status. Specifically, it falls to
102

See 5 U.S.C. app. § 501(a).
See id. § 502(b)(2).
104
See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c).
105
See Neal Devins & Alli Orr Larsen, Going En Banc 3 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
journal) (“Going en banc takes a lot of time and often results in discord . . . .”); Tracey E. George, The
Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 218 (1999)
(“In addition to the material costs such as delay, judicial inefficiency, administrative expense, and
attorneys’ fees, seeking one voice can produce the opposite effect by causing intracourt acrimony,
ideological polarization, and lost collegiality.” (footnote omitted)).
106
See Devins & Larsen, supra note 105, at 8 (citing Ryan W. Copus, Statistical Precedent:
Allocating Judicial Attention, 73 VAND. L. REV. 605, 608 (2020) (“The courts now review a mere 0.19%
of decisions en banc, down from 1.5% in 1964.”)).
107
Burbank et al., supra note 18, at 81.
108
See id. at 81–82.
109
See Rymer, supra note 9, at 322 (“Three-judge panels make decisions understanding that if a
majority of their colleagues disagree on an important issue, their decision will be reconsidered en banc.”).
103
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individual courts to decide basic matters such as whether senior judges will
retain their chambers or be moved to a less desirable space to make room for
a new judge, whether two senior judges (or only one) may sit on a panel of
three, and whether senior judges may vote on court administrative matters.
One might assume that the federal courts of appeals had formulated a
uniform set of answers to such questions—but not if one were a student of
judicial administration. The circuit courts vary widely in their own practices
and customs,110 and, as the next Part details, their treatment of senior judges
is no exception.
FINDINGS: VARIATIONS IN THE TREATMENT OF SENIOR JUDGES
The choices that courts make about how they will run as institutions can
have far-reaching consequences. And indeed, decisions about how judges
will be treated upon assuming senior status can affect whether some judges
will opt to assume that status or remain active,111 as I describe further in Part
III. But it can be a complex task to piece together precisely how all of the
different federal courts of appeals operate and what choices about senior
status they have made.
Specifically, some information about senior status is published, though
not consistently in the same sources. For example, some details can be found
in some courts’ local rules, whereas other details are found in internal
operating procedures (I.O.P.s). However, some relevant information is not
published and therefore not publicly available at all. Indeed, this particular
data can only be gathered by interviewing and surveying judges and court
administrators. This project relied on all of these sources and forms of data
collection.
First, as part of a larger research project with Judge Jon O. Newman on
the internal operation of the federal courts of appeals,112 the local rules and
I.O.P.s that are publicly available were searched for pertinent references to
the treatment of senior judges. Second, all current (and several recent) chief
judges of the federal court of appeals were interviewed.113 Finally, a detailed
110

See generally Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals, supra note 51 (documenting the
widespread variation in case management and staffing approaches across the courts of appeals).
111
This Essay is focused on judges who wish to continue performing their judicial functions, and so
the relevant choice is between doing so as an active judge or a senior one. Of course, decisions about how
judges are treated in senior status could also impact a judge’s decision ultimately to retire. For a greater
exposition of judicial retirement and the factors that go into a judge’s decision to leave the judiciary
outright, see generally Burbank et al., supra note 18.
112
See NEWMAN & LEVY, supra note 26.
113
These interviews took place throughout the 2020 calendar year. Most were conducted via video
conferencing, although a few were conducted by telephone. As per past practice, these interviews were
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questionnaire was sent to senior court administrators of all thirteen circuits,
and written answers were received back from twelve of them to date.114
Together, the data from these different sources tell an important story
about the way senior judges are treated in the federal courts of appeals. What
follows is a descriptive account of several practices concerning senior
judges, ranging from those involving en banc and regular panel procedures
to those touching on certain scheduling and even opinion-writing preferences
of seniors. To be sure, this Part is not meant to be a perfectly comprehensive
list; the goal is not to specify how each and every circuit approaches all of
the topics here. Rather, the goal is to note the range of different practices—
that one circuit does X where several other circuits do Y—while providing
some illustrative examples. In so doing, this Part documents just how much
variation there is in the treatment of senior judges from circuit to circuit—
variation that can, in some instances, also be the key to future reform.
A. En Banc Panels and Regular Panels
As noted in the previous Part, one of the most significant changes that
occurs when one takes senior status is no longer being able to participate in
en banc court decisions, unless the judge was on the original panel to decide
the case.115 Furthermore, a senior judge is not authorized to participate in the
court’s en banc poll—that is, the vote about whether the case will be heard
by the court as a whole.116 These matters are all governed by statute and
federal rule.117 But there is a key point of en banc process concerning senior
judges that is not addressed by statute or federal rule, meaning local rules
and customs come into play.
Although senior judges may not themselves vote in an en banc poll,
there is the question of whether a senior judge may call for such a poll. In
other words, does a senior judge have the authority to formally bring a case
to the court’s attention and prompt a vote among its active members to decide
whether to rehear it all together? In the Ninth Circuit, senior judges are
permitted to call for an en banc poll, regardless of whether they were part of

semi-structured (and were on additional topics related to judicial administration for a larger research
project being conducted with Judge Jon O. Newman). Again, as per past practice, all of the interviews
were conducted following assurances of anonymity. For an example of a past study with these parameters,
see Levy, Visiting Judges, supra note 88, at 103–04.
114
Specifically, as of December 7, 2020, survey responses were received back from the D.C., First,
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Federal Circuits.
115
See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c).
116
See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
117
See supra notes 115–116 and accompanying text.
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the original panel to hear the case.118 By contrast, other circuits, including
(but not limited to) the Seventh and Tenth, permit senior judges to call for
an en banc poll only if they were part of the merits panel.119
Beyond the questions that arise from en banc review are questions
associated with ordinary panels that hear appeals in the first instance. While
senior judges are, of course, permitted to hear cases as part of regular
argument panels, there is the matter of how many may sit together. In some
circuits, including the Third and the Ninth, two senior judges may sit together
as long as there is an active judge to round out the trio.120 By contrast, in other
circuits, including the Fourth and Federal Circuits, oral argument panels
generally will not include more than one senior judge.121
B. Administrative Matters
In addition to deciding cases, the judges of the courts of appeals also
come together at court meetings to decide various administrative matters.
These matters can be quite important for how the court conducts business—
for example, these matters can include changes to the court’s local rules.
Active judges attend and vote on administrative matters, but different circuits
have different rules about the extent to which senior judges may have a hand
in deciding such matters.
Specifically, there is significant variation when it comes to voting at
court meetings. By custom or local provision, senior judges of some circuits,
including (but not limited to) the D.C., Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits,
are permitted to vote on administrative matters at court meetings.122 In
contrast, senior judges do not vote on administrative matters in other circuits,

118
See NEWMAN & LEVY, supra note 26 (discussing survey data from the Ninth Circuit) (survey
response on file with author).
119
See id. (discussing survey data from the Seventh and Tenth Circuits) (survey responses on file
with author). The Second Circuit falls somewhere in between the circuits described above. Formally, the
Second Circuit permits a senior judge to request an en banc poll to rehear a decision if the judge was on
the original panel. 2D CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING PROC. 35.1(a). That said, a senior judge who was not
on the original panel in that circuit may ask the chief judge to call for an en banc poll. See NEWMAN &
LEVY, supra note 26 (discussing data from an interview regarding the Second Circuit conducted on
November 5, 2020) (transcript on file with author).
120
See NEWMAN & LEVY, supra note 26 (discussing survey data from the Third and Ninth Circuits)
(survey responses on file with author); 9TH CIR. R. E(5).
121
See NEWMAN & LEVY, supra note 26 (discussing survey data from the Fourth Circuit) (survey
response on file with author); FED. CIR. R. 47.2(a).
122
See NEWMAN & LEVY, supra note 26 (discussing survey data from the D.C., Seventh, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits) (survey responses on file with author); U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIR.,
HANDBOOK OF PRACTICE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES 4 (2019); 7TH CIR. OPERATING PROC. 2(a); 9TH
CIR. GEN. ORD. 10.2(a).
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including the Second, Third, and Fifth (though it was noted that in the
Second, senior judges receive all memoranda regarding administrative
matters and may express their views on such matters in court meetings).123
C. Seating of Judges, Order of Judges on Opinions, and Chambers
A layperson may not think much about where a judge sits in relation to
other panel members during oral argument or ceremonial events. Similarly,
those outside the law and perhaps most outside of the judiciary may not
notice the order in which the judges are listed on an opinion. But this suite
of topics, which we might put under the heading “precedence accorded
senior judges,” can matter a great deal as signs of respect to the judges
themselves.
Beginning with seating arrangements, in most circuits senior judges
have precedence over active judges when determining how the judges will
be placed along the bench for oral argument. Specifically, this is so in the
First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Federal
Circuits.124 This means the presiding judge—the most senior active judge on
the panel—will sit in the center, the senior judge will sit to the presider’s
right, and the most junior judge will sit to the presider’s left.125 However, not
all courts of appeals follow this approach. For example, active judges have
precedence over senior judges in seating on such panels in the D.C., Third,
Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits.126
At formal events such as an investiture ceremony for a new judge, a
memorial session for a deceased judge, or a portrait unveiling, the whole
court is often seated together along a single bench. As with Supreme Court
Justices, the federal appellate judges generally sit in order of seniority. But
there is a question of where senior judges should be placed—toward the
center of the court or out at the flanks. Some circuits, by custom, give
precedence to senior judges, meaning the judges are arranged by strict
seniority and the senior judges end up closest to the center of the bench.127
Others, however, give precedence to active judges, meaning the senior

123
See NEWMAN & LEVY, supra note 26 (discussing survey data from the Second, Third, and Fifth
Circuits) (survey responses on file with author).
124
See id. (discussing survey data from the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth,
and Federal Circuits) (survey responses on file with author).
125
See id. (discussing survey data from the Tenth Circuit) (survey response on file with author).
126
See NEWMAN & LEVY, supra note 26 (discussing survey data from the D.C., Fourth, and Eleventh
Circuits) (survey responses on file with author); 3D CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING PROC. 3.2.
127
See id. (discussing survey data from, among others, the First, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Federal
Circuits) (survey responses on file with author).

1248

115:1227 (2021)

The Promise of Senior Judges

judges are seated at the edges of the bench, after the most junior of their
colleagues.128
The order of judges is also relevant to the caption of opinions and orders
of the court. Specifically, there is a question of whether judges should be
listed strictly on the basis of seniority (after the chief judge) or whether senior
judges should be placed below active judges. In the Third and Fourth
Circuits, for example, senior judges are listed after active judges on opinions
and orders, whereas in other circuits, including (but not limited to) the First,
Second, Fifth, and the Seventh, the opposite is true.129
Finally, while slightly further afield, similar questions arise when it
comes to the chambers a judge will keep. A judge may be particularly
attached to his or her chambers, which are akin to a mini office suite that he
or she will have occupied for years if not decades. In many circuits, by
custom, senior judges are permitted to retain their chambers and continue to
use them indefinitely.130 In contrast, judges in at least one circuit may have
to give up their chambers and move to space that is less centrally located to
make room for the newly appointed members of their court.131 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, as detailed in Part III, the potential loss of chambers is of
great importance to some active judges considering senior status.
D. Honoring the Preferences of Senior Judges
Most active judges have very little say in when they will hear argument
throughout the year.132 While it is possible in some circuits to ask not to sit
on a specific day because of a preexisting conflict, most judges are assigned
to particular sitting days throughout the year and those are the dates when
they will sit.133 Senior judges have the ability to decide how often they will
sit—such as, say, a half or even a quarter of the sitting days of their active

128

See id. (discussing survey data from the D.C. Circuit) (survey response on file with author).
See id. (discussing survey data from the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits)
(survey responses on file with author).
130
See id. (discussing survey data from, among others, the First, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits)
(survey responses on file with author).
131
See id. (discussing data from an interview regarding the Federal Circuit conducted on July 21,
2020) (transcript on file with author). And in at least one other circuit, some senior judges may need to
share visiting chambers when coming in from out of town for oral argument. See id. (discussing survey
data from the Sixth Circuit) (survey response on file with author).
132
See Marin K. Levy, Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 103 CORNELL L. REV.
65, 81–93 (2017) [hereinafter Levy, Panel Assignments] (describing the factors that court administrators
take into account when setting the oral argument calendar, with particular scheduling requests of active
judges playing a very minor role).
133
See id.
129
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colleagues.134 But in some circuits, senior judges are also able to decide when
they will sit.135 Specifically, in the Second Circuit, senior judges submit to
the chief judge particular dates when they would like to sit in the upcoming
year—say, the first two weeks of September and October, but not in
November or December.136 In a related vein, some, but not all, circuits permit
judges to decide where they will sit. For example, the Ninth Circuit, with
several hearing locations, provides that senior judges will not be given
sittings that are taking place far afield from their own chambers unless the
judge specifically elects to do so.137
Honoring the preferences of senior judges can extend beyond the
calendar and into the voting conference. After a sitting, the three judges of a
panel must decide: first, which cases will be decided by published opinions;
second, how each panel member expects to vote in each case; and third, who
will author each opinion. In the Second Circuit, there is a custom whereby
the panel presider asks a senior judge which opinion the judge would like to
write or would prefer not to write—and the request is generally honored.138
Comparable customs are found in other circuits, including the First and
Seventh.139 However, in other circuits, including the Fourth, Ninth, and
Federal Circuits, there is no norm or custom in place to honor the opinionwriting preferences of senior judges.140
*

*

*

In short, there are significant differences between the experiences of
senior judges from circuit to circuit. There is a value in documenting these
variations in their own right, as part of a larger project of understanding the
unwritten practices and norms of the federal courts of appeals. But it also
stands to reason that these differences are of consequence. As the next Part
details, some of these differences, particularly cumulatively, could impact
134
See 28 U.S.C. § 294(b); see also Albert Yoon, As You Like It: Senior Federal Judges and the
Political Economy of Judicial Tenure, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 495, 511 (2005) (“Senior judges
enjoy discretion not afforded to active judges with respect to the number of cases they adjudicate . . . .”).
135
Levy, Panel Assignments, supra note 132, at 85–86.
136
Id. at 86.
137
See 9TH CIR. GEN. ORD. 3.2(c).
138
See NEWMAN & LEVY, supra note 26 (discussing survey data from the Second Circuit) (survey
response on file with author).
139
See id. (discussing survey data from the First and Seventh Circuits) (survey responses on file with
author).
140
See id. (discussing survey data from the Fourth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits) (survey responses
on file with author).
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how soon certain judges are willing to assume senior status after they are
eligible.
REFORM PROPOSAL: ALTERING PRACTICES TO MAKE SENIOR STATUS
MORE ATTRACTIVE
Parts I and II each have their own lessons to offer when it comes to
considering potential judicial reforms going forward. As Part I details, for
much of the existence of the courts of appeals, there have been concerns that
there are too few judges for the caseload at hand.141 Even with the workload
currently down from its high point in the early 2000s, it is still higher than it
was the last time judgeships were added to the federal courts of appeals, now
thirty years ago.142 And so, there is a strong argument that the bench should
be enlarged again.143
That said, there are challenges that come with expanding the bench
outright. First, as previously noted, there are several logistical difficulties
that attend the creation of new judgeships. Each time judges, court
administrators, scholars, and members of Congress have examined the issue,
they have raised concerns about existing circuits becoming too large,
particularly for a single en banc review.144 Indeed, approximately half of the
existing circuits have exceeded or are close to fifteen active judgeships,145
which has been considered an upper bound for manageable en banc courts.146

141

See supra Section I.A.
Again, it is worth noting that one judgeship was reassigned from the D.C. Circuit to the Ninth
Circuit, effective January 21, 2009. See supra note 50.
143
Indeed, the Judicial Conference of the United States recently recommended the modest addition
of five new permanent judgeships (all in the Ninth Circuit). See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS.,
ADDITIONAL JUDGESHIPS OR CONVERSION OF EXISTING JUDGESHIPS RECOMMENDED BY THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE tbl.1 (2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2019_judicial_conference_
judgeship_recommendations_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/EFY3-6EUH].
144
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
145
See 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (listing the number of allotted judges per circuit, including thirteen in the
Second, fourteen in the Third, fifteen in the Fourth, seventeen in the Fifth, sixteen in the Sixth, and twentynine in the Ninth).
146
The Hruska Commission specifically noted that, at the time, the Fifth Circuit had fifteen active
judges, and that “[s]erious problems of administration and of internal operation inevitably result with so
large a court . . . . For example, it becomes more difficult to sit en banc . . . .” HRUSKA COMMISSION
REPORT I, supra note 69, at 1–2. It was precisely because of these concerns that Congress soon after
declared that a court with more than fifteen active judges may determine by local rule the number of
judges that serve on an en banc court. See Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629,
1633. But even fifteen may be too high. The Ninth Circuit experimented with a fifteen-member en banc
court only to quickly abandon the plan, as argument proved “unwieldly” and the opinion process “prone
to delay,” in favor of an eleven-judge en banc court. See Marsha S. Berzon, Introduction, 41 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 287, 288–89 (2011).
142
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An alternative would be splitting a number of existing circuits, but this is not
a particularly attractive approach either. It is difficult to see how each circuit
could retain the features often thought important when drawing geographical
boundaries—chief among them, encompassing more than a single state and
not dividing states—and how the judiciary as a whole would not begin to
fragment.147
Beyond the problem of logistical or implementation costs, there are
political and even legitimacy costs to contend with. The public discourse in
the run-up to the 2020 election was dominated by debates around courtpacking.148 It is unclear if Congress would be inclined to expand the
intermediate appellate courts in the near future, but if it is, a significant
expansion would surely be cast as politically motivated. And regardless of
what political cost Congress might be charged, if charged at all, I fear the
greater cost would be borne by the judiciary. As others have argued, the
perceived legitimacy of our court system might suffer if made the object of
an alleged court-packing plan.149
So, this Essay’s reform proposal is a straightforward one: look within
the judiciary itself to try to alleviate workload burdens. Specifically, the
proposal is to focus on a number of the practices and procedures that affect
senior judges, as outlined in Part II, and encourage the courts of appeals to
adopt those that would make taking senior status more attractive. This reform
would therefore be judge-generated, unlike so many of the proposals today
that would have the political branches act upon the courts.150
147
See THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS
APPEALS 56 (1994) (noting the criteria that the Hruska Commission employed when considering
splitting circuits, including that circuits should be composed of at least three states); Carl Tobias, Why
Congress Should Not Split the Ninth Circuit, 50 SMU L. REV. 583, 594 (1997) (citing HRUSKA
COMMISSION REPORT I, supra note 69, at 237) (describing the problems of a one-state circuit, as
articulated by the Hruska Commission, including that such a circuit would lack diversity among its judges
and that the senators from a single state could ultimately shape the judicial selections of an entire federal
appellate court); Martha Dragich, Back to the Drawing Board: Re-Examining Accepted Premises of
Regional Circuit Structure, 12 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 201, 205 (2011) (considering the structure of
the federal courts of appeals and concluding, among other things, that the principle of having each circuit
contain at least three states “preserve[s] the generalist tradition of the federal courts and promote[s]
uniformity of federal law, at least weakly,” and that the principle against splitting a single state between
two or more circuits helps to ensure a uniform interpretation of state law). But see HRUSKA COMMISSION
REPORT I, supra note 69, at 13 (recommending that California be split into two circuits). For concerns
about fragmentation of the judiciary, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
148
See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
149
See sources cited supra note 17.
150
See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 86 (proposing that “[t]he President appoint[] a new [Supreme Court]
Justice in every odd-numbered year” and that “Congress create[] two en banc courts” with the first
composed of all active Justices and meant for deciding the Court’s original jurisdiction cases, and the
second composed only of the nine most junior Justices and meant for deciding the Court’s appellate
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To be sure, this recommendation is not particularly revolutionary;
indeed, the 1968 report by the American Bar Foundation, noted earlier,
suggested as much, arguing that “stronger incentives should be provided for
acceptance of senior status by Circuit Judges eligible to do so.”151 The
recommendations of this Essay, though, are based upon the finer details of
the internal operating practices of the courts of appeals and opportunities for
change that are not even necessarily known to all those within the courts
themselves.
In particular, courts would do well to consider implementing the
following policies and rules where they are not already in place. First,
accommodate, where possible, basic preferences of senior judges. Such
preferences include those related to sittings—for example, in the circuits that
hear cases on a rolling basis,152 wishing to hear argument during certain
months and not others, and in the circuits that hear argument in multiple
locations,153 wanting to not travel too far afield from their home station.
Additionally, more courts could be solicitous of the preferences of senior
judges when it comes to opinion assignments, and specifically could do more
to honor a request from a senior to select (or reject) a particular writing
assignment at a sitting.
Second, courts could do more to lower what I will call the “dignitary”
costs that attend taking senior status. For example, all of the courts of appeals
could keep the precedence of judges after they take senior status. There is no
need to list judges on opinions in an order other than one dictated by straight
seniority. And avoiding a scenario in which judges are moved lower down
in the panel order after taking senior status prevents what might look like the
signaling of a demotion. Similarly, at ceremonial functions—investiture
jurisdiction cases); Kramer, supra note 86 (arguing that Congress should expand the Supreme Court, and
specifically endorsing a proposal that would add a new Justice in each Congress, with only the nine most
junior Justices deciding cases that are part of the Court’s regular docket).
151
See AM. BAR FOUND., supra note 61, at 3.
152
Courts that hear cases on a rolling basis stand in contrast with those that have designated weeks
for hearing argument. See Levy, Panel Assignments, supra note 132, at 67 n.4.
153
Whereas some circuits hear argument predominantly in one location (the D.C. Circuit in
Washington, D.C., the Second Circuit in New York City), others routinely hear argument in multiple
locations (the First Circuit in Boston and Puerto Rico, the Ninth Circuit in Anchorage, Pasadena, San
Francisco, Seattle, and so forth). See Oral Argument Calendar, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIR.,
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/sixtyday.nsf/fullcalendar?OpenView&count=1000
[https://perma.cc/V99Q-ES8P]; Calendars, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIR.,
https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/clerk/calendars/calendars.html [https://perma.cc/2DNV-YS5Z]; Calendar
Information, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIR., https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/calendarinformation [https://perma.cc/Z8JS-BGF8]; Previous Oral Argument Dates and Locations, U.S. CTS. FOR
THE NINTH CIR., https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/calendar/archive.php [https://perma.cc/QQH8-8UXN];
see also 28 U.S.C. § 48 (noting the locations where the courts of appeals “shall hold regular sessions”).
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ceremonies of a new judge and the like—there is no apparent reason for
seating senior judges “on the wings” of the bench, placing them below, in
stature, their most junior colleagues. And finally, within this topic, greater
efforts could be made to ensure that senior judges are able to maintain their
chambers, where possible. While this may seem an expensive proposition,
the question is always about the relevant point of comparison. If the
alternative is adding judgeships full stop and needing to build out new
chambers in any event, this option is no more expensive and ensures that
judges need not feel that they are being displaced from the office space that
they have inhabited, sometimes for decades, all to make room for someone
new.
Third, courts would do well to consider eliminating what may be
unnecessary distinctions between senior judges and active ones. For
example, circuits should examine existing rules that prevent more than one
senior judge from sitting on a panel, when other courts permit two.154 And,
perhaps more importantly, courts that currently prohibit senior judges from
voting on administrative matters should reconsider their policy. If there are
concerns that a judge who feels distant from the bench—who perhaps sits
only a handful of days a year—is having an equal say in important matters
before the court, the circuits could consider instituting a threshold. For
example, circuits could insist that a senior judge carry at least a 25%
workload, the same threshold for being eligible for pay increases,155 to vote
on court matters in order to mitigate such concerns. The larger point is that
there need not be such a strong demarcation between senior judges and active
judges in these respects.
The broader argument is that changes along these lines—particularly
when made together—could make senior status more attractive to at least
some eligible judges. And while one could argue that it simply stands to
reason that these changes could be dispositive for some, there is no need to
speculate. Thanks to the foundational work of Burbank, Plager, and
Ablavsky, we have survey data from judges—both those who decided to go
senior and those who decided to remain active—about the factors relevant to

154
See supra notes 120–121 and accompanying text. It is certainly possible that the downside risks
would predominate over the benefits of permitting more than one senior judge to sit on a panel,
particularly if a given circuit has a sizeable number of senior judges who are older and not sitting so often
(and thus are less connected to the court’s current decisions). But given the benefits—that a change could
help incentivize eligible judges to take senior status, particularly if some judges do not want to miss the
opportunity to sit with others in their cohort—it is at least worth considering this potential policy change.
With many thanks to Aaron-Andrew Bruhl for this point.
155
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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their decision.156 Regarding the category of judges who opted to take senior
status when eligible, on average, the motivating factors in descending order
were: (1) wanting “the federal tax advantages senior status affords,” (2)
“other interests made [them] want a lighter case load,” (3) wanting “to help
the court by creating a vacancy,” and (4) wanting “to be selective about
[their] case load,” with all being ranked “somewhat important.”157 But
perhaps even more telling than these results were the additional comments
that several of the respondents made to the authors about their experience as
senior judges. Specifically, “several circuit judges in senior status criticized
either their inability to preside and make opinion assignments, their inability
to vote whether en banc review of a panel decision should occur . . . , or the
inability even of those carrying a significant load to be active in
administrative work.”158 Other respondents stressed the dignitary costs
associated with the shift, noting that they did not like the title “senior judge”
as it suggested a state of retirement to the bar and the public.159 One
respondent remarked that the “treatment of seniors on my court has caused a
number of judges to delay going senior.”160
Burbank et al. further note that in response to a questionnaire sent to the
circuit executives of the courts, one court administrator mentioned that
senior judges occasionally expressed displeasure about the loss of chambers
and the ability to decide “certain court matters.”161 This response also noted
“anecdotal evidence that some judges have delayed taking senior status over
such concerns”162—something Burbank, Plager, and Ablavsky noted was
reflected in comments that they had heard directly from judges.
Regarding the category of judges who were eligible to take senior status
but had not yet elected to do so, Burbank et al. collected similarly instructive
data. When asked why they had decided to remain in regular active service
instead of assuming senior status, the average responses of judges, after
noting a desire to remain active in en banc hearings and to retain their current
caseload and staffing levels, next ranked in importance “keep[ing] [their]
chambers” and wanting not “to surrender [their] seniority for the purpose of
presiding, opinion assignment, ceremonial occasions, etc.”—with all rated at
least “somewhat important.”163

156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

See Burbank et al., supra note 18, at 42–55, 78–83.
See id. at 45.
Id. at 51 (footnotes omitted).
See id.
See id. at 53.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 45, 79–80.
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These additional findings suggest that if more could be done for senior
judges—to ensure that they not lose their chambers, to provide them some
choice in opinion assignment, to not have them be “demoted” in rank on
opinions and at ceremonial functions, and the like—more eligible judges
would make the transition. This, in turn, would create more vacancies for the
courts of appeals without adding new judicial seats. Accordingly, it would
increase the judge power of the federal appellate courts while leaving the en
banc courts untouched, thereby limiting at least some concerns about
undermining the uniformity in circuit law.
To be sure, these proposed reforms, even if implemented in every
circuit, would not be sufficient to persuade every eligible judge to take senior
status. There are some judges who have not become senior for reasons that
cannot, or should not, be “fixed.” For example, as the data above suggest,
there are some judges who put a great deal of stock into being part of their
court’s en banc proceedings.164 And while it would be possible to change the
requirement that members of the en banc court be active judges (aside from
a senior judge who was on the original panel), doing so would not be easy
nor advisable. This requirement is set forth by statute, unlike the other
policies and rules mentioned here.165 Furthermore, there are legitimate
concerns about expanding the en banc court significantly, as previously
noted.166 Accordingly, the proposals outlined above will not be able to reach
those who wish to remain in regular active service for reasons related to en
banc proceedings.
Additionally, there are presumably those who have not taken senior
status because they are hoping that the administration will soon change and
would like a president of their party to nominate their successor. If this
consideration is important to a judge, ensuring that panel members are listed
on an opinion in the order of strict seniority will not move the needle. That
said, it is important to recognize that not all, or even necessarily most, judges
fall into this category. Returning to the survey of eligible judges, Burbank et
al. asked if the respondents were “waiting for a different appointing authority
(i.e., a different political administration) to nominate my successor” and the
mean response was that this consideration was of little importance—a 2.1
out of 7.167 Put differently, this factor was ranked, on average, eleventh out
of fourteen in relative importance.168 It is entirely possible that the judges
164
165
166
167
168
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underreported just how salient the party of the next president was to them,
although there are other studies that suggest it has not been the key
consideration for most judges historically.169 It is also worth noting that of
the judges who are currently eligible to assume senior status at the end of
President Trump’s Administration, while there are more who were appointed
by Democrats than appointed by Republicans, there is a healthy mix of
both.170 The larger point is that it stands to reason that changes to some of the
practices and norms outlined in Part II could help entice some eligible judges
to assume senior status. Even if only 10% of the current eligible judges
decided to take senior status based upon changes to these policies, we would
have six new vacancies—or one more judgeship than the Judicial Conference
recently requested.171
Moreover, the hope is that by changing these policies and having some
additional judges take senior status, yet more judges could become inclined
to do the same. A judge might not wish to take senior status if she is the only
one in her cohort considering the proposition, but she might feel differently
if a few others on her court decided to take the plunge.
169
See, e.g., Richard L. Vining, Jr., Politics, Pragmatism, and Departures from the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 1954–2004, 90 SOC. SCI. Q. 834, 850 (2009) (finding that “[e]vidence of strategic political
behavior is limited” whereas “[p]ersonal considerations were significant” and “[p]ension eligibility was
influential as predicted” on timing of leaving active status). While there is general agreement that pension
eligibility is a critical factor in the timing of taking senior status, there is less agreement about whether,
and to what extent, political factors play a role. See Terri Peretti & Alan Rozzi, Modern Departures from
the U.S. Supreme Court: Party, Pensions, or Power?, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 131, 138–47 (2011) (noting
studies that found evidence of strategic retirement, including David C. Nixon & J. David Haskin, Judicial
Retirement Strategies: The Judge’s Role in Influencing Party Control of the Appellate Courts, 28 AM.
POL. Q. 458, 485 (2000), and James F. Spriggs, II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Calling It Quits: Strategic
Retirement on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1893–1991, 48 POL. RSCH. Q. 573, 592–93 (1995), and
those that did not, including Albert Yoon, Pension, Politics, and Judicial Tenure: An Empirical Study of
Federal Judges,1869–2002, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 143, 155 (2006)). It is also certainly possible that
political factors have played a more pertinent role in recent times, and at least one study is underway to
measure those effects. See Josh Blackman, Which Ninth Circuit Judges Were Waiting for a Democratic
President
to
Take
Senior
Status?,
REASON
(Nov.
30,
2020,
1:38
PM),
https://reason.com/volokh/2020/11/30/which-ninth-circuit-judges-were-waiting-for-a-democraticpresident-to-take-senior-status/ [https://perma.cc/F443-4HD2] (noting that the author, Josh Blackman,
and James Phillips are in the process of studying appellate judges who strategically time their decision to
take senior status, including during recent administrations).
170
This figure was arrived at by examining the Federal Judicial Center’s Biographical Directory of
Article III Judges. See Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges: Export, supra note 25.
Specifically, of the sixty-four judges who I calculated to be eligible to take senior status as of December
4, 2020, twenty-seven were appointed by Republican presidents in the first instance and thirty-seven were
appointed by Democratic presidents in the first instance. If the president who appointed a judge to his or
her final appointment is counted instead (say, to a judge’s seat on the court of appeals after initially being
appointed to a district court), the figures are twenty-six judges who were appointed by Republican
presidents and thirty-eight judges who were appointed by Democratic presidents.
171
See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., supra note 143.
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All that said, it is important to note that there are further limitations to
this set of proposals, beyond that they will almost certainly not reach all of
the judges who are eligible, though none appears to be fatal. If Congress
creates a new judgeship, the receiving court has the benefit of one additional
active judge. If, instead, an active judge takes senior status, there is still only
one active judge associated with that seat, and the benefit is the service
provided by the senior judge. That senior judge could choose to take a full
caseload but might well take less. Furthermore, many of the judges who
would take senior status as soon as eligible under the proposed policy
changes would likely take senior status at some point anyway—these
changes would simply move up the timeline. (And so, a judge who might
have waited until the age of seventy-five might now take senior status at
sixty-five instead.) Taken together, the point is that the workload help that
comes from a judge taking senior status as soon as possible is not equal to
the help that comes from creating a new judicial seat. If the senior judges
continued to take a full or nearly full workload, that help would still be
considerable—but it is a limited solution.
Another limitation in theory is that the additional judge power will not
necessarily be added where it is needed most. When Congress decides to add
new judgeships at the behest of the Judicial Conference, it is done after
considering which courts are most in need given their workloads.172 This
Essay’s reform proposal is not circuit-specific, and one may wonder if the
circuits most in need have a large enough pool of judges who are eligible to
take senior status and an opportunity to further incentivize “going senior.”
Based upon the data, the answer appears to be yes to both. Perhaps
unsurprisingly to students of judicial administration, the circuit most in need
of assistance is the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Judicial
Conference recently recommended that five new judgeships be added there
and there alone.173 Currently, the Ninth Circuit has more than ten judges who
are eligible to take senior status who have not yet done so.174 And based upon
the findings in Part II, there are practices the circuit could alter to make senior
status more attractive—for example, the court could give senior judges their
first choice in opinion assignment coming out of a sitting. 175 But even if this

172
See Judiciary Makes the Case for New Judgeships, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. (June 30,
2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/06/30/judiciary-makes-case-new-judgeships
[https://perma.cc/32PL-GPSA].
173
See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 143.
174
See Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges: Export, supra note 25.
175
See supra notes 138–140 and accompanying text (detailing how some circuits, the Ninth not
among them, give senior judges preference when determining opinion authors).
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were not the case and the most overburdened of the circuits had no practices
that could be made more favorable to senior judges, the federal courts of
appeals have a built-in solution. Senior judges from the less burdened courts
could sit by designation on those that are more burdened and help decide
cases.176 This system of visiting judges is widely used today, particularly by
the Ninth Circuit,177 which recently had visiting judges author over 8% of its
written opinions.178 And while not a perfect solution to the mismatch
problem, it would ensure that the courts that are most in need of help
ultimately receive assistance.
Finally, it is important to note that these proposals are not without their
costs. There are logistical and even economic costs to contend with. Assuring
that senior judges will maintain their chambers may be particularly difficult
in some circuits with limited available space, such as the Federal Circuit.179
And even for courts with chambers outside of Lafayette Square, it might be
quite costly to permit senior judges to retain their chambers. As noted earlier,
if the alternative is that the senior judge maintains active status and a new
judgeship is created and new chambers are constructed, the costs should be
comparable. But it is worth noting that a new judgeship may not be the
alternative if Congress is disinclined to act.
There are other costs that are harder to quantify. For example, having a
rule whereby senior judges are given their first choice of opinion assignment,
while helpful for making senior status more attractive, may come at the
expense of the presider’s powers and prerogatives. This would not seem to
be a significant issue, as some circuits already have such a norm in place,
and it has not caused any reported problems. But it is worth noting that there
may be costs that come with these reforms—costs that appear to be offset by
the gains in judge power, but costs worth noting nonetheless.
Relatedly, it is possible that providing judges with more incentives to
take senior status would be viewed as politically motivated—an attempt to
176
See Levy, Visiting Judges, supra note 88, at 98–101 (describing the modern-day practices of
sitting by designation and how the practices operate officially to support overburdened courts).
177
See Judges Help Judges When Courts Face Heavy Caseloads, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS.
(Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2018/11/08/judges-help-judges-when-courts-faceheavy-caseloads [https://perma.cc/XY5S-MWEZ] (noting that “[t]he Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
welcomed more than 60 visiting judges for intercircuit assignments in 2017, sitting for a combined total
of about 200 days”).
178
See U.S. CTS. FOR THE NINTH CIR., 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 47 (2019),
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/judicial_council/publications/AnnualReport2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/A
9JK-VZFU].
179
The Federal Circuit is famously housed in a complex that includes historic homes on the east side
of Lafayette Square, right near the White House in Washington, D.C. See generally GEORGE E.
HUTCHINSON, THE HISTORY OF MADISON PLACE, LAFAYETTE SQUARE, WASHINGTON, D.C. (2d ed.
2008).
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indirectly create vacancies during a particular presidential administration.
While this is certainly possible, the hope is that tinkering with the finer
details of how senior judges are treated—especially by the courts and not by
Congress—would not be understood to remotely resemble court-packing.
Moreover, the larger goal, as noted earlier, is that more judges will take
senior status as soon as they are eligible, which would mean fewer would
wait for a president of a particular political party to be elected. If normbuilding is possible, the process could ultimately make the creation of
vacancies less political, not more. More broadly, the judges themselves could
solve not all, but certainly some, of their own workload problems and
simultaneously help keep their branch of government above not all, but
certainly some of the political fray.
CONCLUSION
As we consider the larger project of judicial reform, we should
recognize that it is not always necessary to think in big, structural terms.
Surely there are times when it is appropriate to reimagine a key element of
our court system. Indeed, if it were not for such times, we would not have
the modern-day courts of appeals. But there is also value in taking smaller
steps towards change. Just as solutions to problems of court capacity can
come from expanding the bench, so, too, can they come from focusing on
judicial perceptions, behaviors, and norms.
Ultimately, this Essay’s reform proposal involves modest changes that
could create substantial benefits for the federal courts of appeals. Its promise
lies with appreciating the finer details of court administration, including
which can feasibly be altered. Just as importantly, its promise lies with not
relying upon the actions of the elected branches, but upon changes that can
be made by the courts themselves.
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